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The Evolution of Human Rights Thinking in
North Korea
ROBERT WEATHERLEY AND SONG JIYOUNG
The official discourse of human rights in North Korea has shown signs of evolution in
recent times, reflecting a variety of philosophical foundations and a need to respond to
mounting criticism from the West. While Confucianism and Marxism have been key in
influencing North Korean rights thinking, some of the more recent official pronounce-
ments on rights have a distinctly nationalistic or ‘juche-oriented’ complexion. This
shift in emphasis reflects the growing importance of juche to North Korea’s state ideol-
ogy in light of what is perceived as an increasingly hostile international environment
that has confronted North Korea since the end of the Cold War and in particular in
consequence of its highly controversial nuclear weapons programme.
Few countries in the world have faced more intense external scrutiny of their
human rights record than the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK:
North Korea). According to reports by government bodies,1 human rights
watchdog organizations2 and United Nations special rapporteurs,3 human
rights violations in the DPRK are legion. They include persecution on the
grounds of religious and political belief, arbitrary detention, forced labour
and a practice known as ‘guilt by association’ in which an entire family can
be punished for a ‘crime’ committed by one of its members. Under the aus-
pices of General Secretary Kim Jong-il, the ruling Korean Workers’ Party
(KWP) severely limits the flow of information into and out of the country
and freedom of speech and expression are tightly controlled. International
human rights groups and foreign journalists are invariably forbidden from
entering the country and the few humanitarian aid workers who are allowed
in usually find themselves subject to strict travel restrictions.
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In the light of these and many other allegations of human rights abuses, we
might be forgiven for assuming that a North Korean commitment to or con-
ception of human rights (inkweon) does not exist or even that there is hostility
towards the idea. Yet this appears not to be the case. In an international
context, for example, the DPRK in 1981 signed both the UN human rights
covenants: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. In 2000
the DPRK added its signature to the Convention on the Rights of the Child
and in 2001 it signed up to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women.
On the domestic front there has been an official, albeit intermittent, dis-
course of human rights since the division of Korea in 1945 and the inception
of the new Kim Il-sung regime, formally established in 1948. This is set out in
successive state constitutions (1948 and 1972 as amended in 1992 and 1998)
and other official publications and pronouncements on the subject. Drawing on
primary sources, many of which have only recently become available, and in
contrast to the existing scholarly works on the subject which (perhaps under-
standably) adopt an exclusively critical perspective,4 this article analyses the
official discourse of human rights in North Korea and identifies the domestic,
international and philosophical variables that make up this discourse.
Background and Structure
On examining the DPRK’s standpoint on rights, it appears that much of the
relevant literature has been published since the early 1990s, despite the exist-
ence of a North Korean tradition of rights from 1945. This increased domestic
focus on rights stems primarily from an increase in international – primarily
Western – criticism of the country’s human rights record following the col-
lapse of the Soviet bloc and the end of the Cold War. The demise of East Euro-
pean socialism left North Korea largely isolated as a socialist state and
consequently more exposed to foreign criticism than before. The volume
and ferocity of this criticism has effectively forced the issue of human
rights more firmly on to the North Korean political agenda by creating a per-
ceived need for Pyongyang to explain (or perhaps justify) precisely its stance
on the subject, although it has not matched Beijing in publishing annual
human rights white papers.5
Given the highly centralized nature of North Korean politics, it is unsur-
prising to find that many of the official statements on human rights have
come directly from the country’s two post-war leaders: Kim Il-sung who
ruled until his death in 1994, and his son and successor Kim Jong-il. In
addition to pronouncements from the very top, there is a growing body of
human rights specialists, such as Kim Chang-ryul, Ahn Myung-hyuk and
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Kim Young-guk, who publish articles on rights in state-controlled journals
such as Workers (Kulloja) and the imaginatively entitled One Thousand
Mile Leaping Horse (Chollima). Most of these specialists carry out research
for a North Korean human rights think-tank, the Human Rights Research
Association ( joseon inkweon yeonku hyeophoe), set up by Kim Jong-il in
the early 1990s to fortify the party line and perhaps also to demonstrate to
the world that there is a consensus within North Korea on the subject.
This article is divided into two broad sections. The first examines DPRK
rights thinking during the early years of the post-revolutionary state, roughly
1945–48. In an effort to unite the nation behind the new regime of Kim Il-sung
and defend it from further foreign aggression after 35 years of Japanese occu-
pation (1910–45), a wide array of rights were accorded to the vast majority of
the North Korean population, including certain capitalist classes. Only those
categorized as opponents of the North Korean state, primarily those who
had earlier conspired with the Japanese occupying forces, were deprived of
rights.
The remainder of the article identifies key features of North Korean rights
thinking during the post-1948 period and traces the philosophical roots of this
thinking. North Korean rights ostensibly have a predominantly Marxist com-
plexion, which is not surprising given the significance of Marxism to the
DPRK’s state ideology. One example of the influence of Marxism is the pri-
ority given to collective rights over the rights of the individual, a common
feature of rights in other communist and former communist countries such
as the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Soviet Union. In explaining
this position, close reference is often made to the Marxist notion of the indi-
vidual as a ‘species being’, an intrinsic member of society who relies upon
society for the realization of his rights to the extent that the rights of society
must logically come first. Another example is the inter-relationship between
entitlement to rights and social class, again a familiar aspect of the rights tra-
dition in the PRC and the former Soviet Union. In keeping with the Marxist
emphasis on continuous class struggle, rights in North Korea have, at least
until recently, been accorded exclusively to the proletariat but withheld
from the bourgeoisie.
The emergence of Marxism in North Korea did not lay the philosophical
foundations for a completely new understanding of rights. Whilst this under-
standing is often enunciated using orthodox Marxist terminology, certain
aspects of it have grown out of the entrenched traditions of Confucianism,
imported into Korea from China during the Three Kingdoms period (57
BC–668 AD) and becoming Korea’s state ideology during the Yi dynasty
(1392–1910).6 For instance, the importance of the collective has its roots
not necessarily in Marxism but in the age old Confucian stress on social – par-
ticularly family – interests to which the interests of the individual were
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subordinate. This emphasis on the family remains a key tenet of North Korean
thinking to the degree that such interests are constitutionally protected (see
below), although the collective is more commonly expressed as ‘the state’
or ‘society’.
A third influencing factor on North Korean rights thinking is the indigen-
ous concept of juche, officially articulated for the first time by Kim Il-sung in
1955.7 Juche can be broadly translated as ‘independence’ or ‘self-reliance’
and is a strongly nationalistic philosophy that places the utmost importance
on autonomy from foreign influence and the establishment of a sovereign
and autarkic state.8 Whilst Marxism is still important in DPRK thinking,
juche has superseded Marxism as the state ideology in an almost defensive
reaction to the increasingly hostile international environment that has con-
fronted North Korea since the end of the Cold War, particularly surrounding
North Korea’s nuclear intentions. This hostility intensified after North Korea
re-enabled its nuclear reactor in Yongbyon (following its withdrawal from the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2003) and tested a nuclear weapon for the
first time in October 2006, and it was manifested through the imposition of a
range of sanctions against Pyongyang by the UN Security Council. Although a
deal was struck in the February 2007 ‘six-party’ talks during which the DPRK
pledged to abandon its nuclear programme in return for, among other things,
the release by Washington of US$25 million from a Macau bank, the DPRK is
yet to commence the decommissioning process, and tension between the
DPRK and the US remains acute.9
This ideological shift towards juche is reflected in some of the more
recent official statements on human rights, often under the heading of ‘our
style of human rights’ (urisik inkweon). For example, the notion of class
rights has gradually diminished and entitlement to rights is now much
more dependent upon an individual’s loyalty to the nation and its ‘virtuous’
leader, Kim Jong-il. Similarly, while collective interests remain highly perti-
nent to North Korean thinking they are now expressed in more juche-specific
terms as the right to national sovereignty and the right to national self-
determination.
Throughout this article comparisons are made between the DPRK and
Chinese traditions of human rights. This is because of the striking similarity
in the historical, political and philosophical background of these two
countries, which has inevitably affected their respective patterns of human
rights thinking. As noted above, the two nations share a long heritage of Con-
fucianism, which originated in China. Then after a period of foreign imperial-
ist domination, both adopted Marxism as their ruling state ideology but with
heavily nationalistic undertones. As we shall see, China, like the DPRK, has
in recent years been forced into a more overt articulation of its human
rights position because of increasing Western criticism of its human rights
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record, and in effect such criticism has made both nations conform to a more
Western-oriented discourse of human rights.
Nation-Building and the Liberation from Japan, 1945–48
The first North Korean references to the concept of human rights were set out
in a document called the Programme of Action for the People’s Sovereignty
(inmin jukweon haengdong kangryeong) issued in August 1945.10 The Pro-
gramme of Action was intended primarily as an ethical guideline for govern-
ment officials, especially those working in the justice and police departments,
many of whom had become accustomed to Japanese colonial-style practices. It
asserted the right to vote and stand for election, equal rights between the sexes
and the right to a guaranteed eight-hour working day with a minimum wage;
individual freedoms comprised those of assembly, association, the press, pub-
lication and religion.
The context for the promulgation of this wide range of human rights was
the liberation from Japan, a process of national catharsis upon which the new
regime sought to build its political legitimacy. After 35 years of Japanese colo-
nial rule, the populace, it was felt, deserved to enjoy all the rights of which
they had been deprived for so long – particularly women, who were treated
so badly by the Japanese imperial military.11 The position of women was
further fortified under the 1946 Gender Equality Act which aimed to eliminate
all the discriminatory practices imposed against women by the Japanese.12
The act contained a number of rights never previously enjoyed by women,
including equal rights with men to vote and to be elected, equal pay for
equal work, social insurance and education, the right to marry and divorce,
and to inherit from parents. Adultery, forced prostitution, polygamy and the
trafficking of women were all prohibited.
The Gender Equality Act and the Programme of Action should also be
understood within the context of constructing a strong nation-state, although
it was not clear at the time whether this would embrace the whole of
Korea.13 With a hostile American presence in South Korea, and Japan and
US support in neighbouring China for the nationalist Guomindang (KMT)
in its war with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the Kim Il-sung
regime deemed it necessary to embrace as many people as possible into the
new post-colonial order in an effort to make North Korea strong and so
resist the threat of foreign intervention. This meant that rights were accorded
to the vast majority of the populace irrespective of factors such as gender and
– significantly, at this stage – social class. Despite the considerable influence
of the Soviet Union, the DPRK did not adhere to the early Soviet tradition of
limiting the enjoyment of rights to the proletariat at the expense of the bour-
geoisie, although this did come later, as we shall see.14
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Some sectors of North Korean society were deprived of their rights and
this was set out in Kim Il-sung’s Twenty-Point Programme ( yisipgae jeong-
kang) of March 1946.15 Drafted as an interim measure before the promulga-
tion of the 1948 Constitution, the Twenty-Point Programme made a clear
delineation between ‘the people’ (inmin), who were entitled to the rights con-
tained in the document, and ‘the enemies’ ( jeok), who were not. The latter,
described as ‘reactionaries, fascists and anti-democratic forces’ (bandong
fascist banminju seryeok), were in the main ‘pro-Japanese elements’ (chinil
bunja), namely those who conspired with the Japanese authorities during
the colonial period. Again, however, there was no clear expression of class
rights, as confirmed by a stipulation that individual handicrafts and commerce –
activities that might well be described as capitalist – would be preserved as
free enterprises.
The definitive pronouncement on human rights during the early DPRK
period was contained in the 1948 Constitution, adopted on 8 September, the
day before the DPRK was formally established. As a statement of its commit-
ment to rights, the relevant section was set out towards the front of the docu-
ment at Chapter 2. Here again, the list of rights was extremely broad-ranging,
stipulating no fewer than 17 rights (and four duties), many lifted directly from
documents such as the Programme for Action and the Twenty-Point Pro-
gramme. As part of Kim Il-sung’s non-class-specific approach, DPRK citizens
were given the freedom to maintain medium and small industrial and commer-
cial enterprises, while, as before, rights were not to be accorded to ‘pro-
Japanese elements’ (Article 12).
This more relaxed approach allowing certain capitalist classes to enjoy
rights was not altogether unusual in newly-established Marxist states. The
CCP adopted a similar position in the 1949 Common Programme, a temporary
constitution of the newly founded PRC issued before the promulgation of the
1954 Constitution. As part of the CCP’s ‘united front’ policy, the Common
Programme extended the enjoyment of rights beyond the traditional bound-
aries of the proletariat to include certain bourgeois classes, primarily the
‘petty bourgeoisie’ (xiaozichan jieji), comprising professional people, small
traders, students and intellectuals, and the ‘national bourgeoisie’ (guomin
zichan jieji) which comprised small-scale factory- and shop-holders.16 By
1954, however, only the proletariat were constitutionally entitled to rights.17
The Post-1948 Period: The Conditionality of Rights
The inter-relationship between rights and social class is probably the most
original feature of rights in Marxist states. In contrast to the established
liberal position, which perceives human rights as the universal entitlement
of all human beings derived from their innate moral value or worth,18 the
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enjoyment of rights in Marxist regimes has traditionally been contingent upon
an individual’s class status: in other words, using orthodox Marxist (although
not necessarily North Korean) terminology, on each person’s socio-economic
relationship to the means of production. In practice this has often meant
that the bourgeoisie, who owned the means of production under the pre-
revolutionary order, are deprived of their rights in the post-revolutionary
state. Conversely the proletariat, previously forced to sell their labour
power, are accorded a full range of rights.
This class-based approach to rights can only properly be understood within
the joint context of class struggle and the need to establish a Leninist-style
‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ after the revolution is won.19 The denial of
rights to the bourgeoisie is part of a much wider struggle to eliminate all
remaining vestiges of bourgeois power from post-revolutionary society and
so facilitate the victory of the proletariat over their erstwhile oppressors.
This, in turn, serves to consolidate the authority of the new Marxist regime
which, in theory at least, functions as the vanguard of the proletarian class.
Notwithstanding the official establishment of the DRPK as a Marxist
state on 9 September 1948, its stance on class rights has not always been
clear. We have already seen how there was no distinction in the 1948 Con-
stitution between those classes that were entitled to rights and those that
were not. The same was also true of the 1972 Constitution (despite being
heralded as North Korea’s first ‘socialist’ constitution), suggesting an
absence of any class conditions to the enjoyment of rights. Article 6 of
the 1972 Constitution appears to confirm this assumption by declaring the
end of class struggle (kaekeup tujaeng) in North Korea: ‘in the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea class antagonism and all forms of exploitation
and oppression of man by man have been eliminated for good’. Logically,
therefore, since there were no antagonistic classes in North Korea, it was
not necessary to use social class as a measure of who should or should
not enjoy rights.
The writings of official theorists during this time suggest that class struggle
was far from over, however, and therefore class rights remained highly rel-
evant. An article in Kulloja, written in 1969, insisted that the revolutionary
struggle would continue for ‘generation after generation’ until the victory of
the proletariat over the bourgeoisie was finally complete.20 Similarly Yim
Chong-bong, in an article published in the Worker’s Daily (Rodong
Sinmun), declared that ‘the ideology of Kim Il-sung calls for a continuous
revolution until the exploiting classes and imperialism are completely swept
away and the great tasks of socialism and communism are achieved in each
individual country and throughout the world’.21
Kim Il-sung’s position on class and class rights was clear. In response to
foreign criticism of his policy of incarcerating political opponents, Kim
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explained in a statement of 1977 that this was justified as a means of protecting
North Korean democracy and human rights from the enemy of the working
classes. Proper punishments to ‘antagonistic’ and ‘impure elements’ who
attempt to destroy the socialist system, Kim claimed, would ensure the protec-
tion of human rights in North Korea.22 Kim Chang-ryul, an official commen-
tator on human rights, concurred with this view in 1990:
Without suppressing a very small number of class enemies and curtail-
ing their destructive attempts to overthrow the socialist system, the
achievements of socialism and the human rights of the working class
can never be protected. The suppression of hostile enemies is not a vio-
lation of human rights; instead it is a humanitarian policy necessary for
the protection of the human rights of the working people.23
This quotation refers to ‘a very small number of class enemies’. However,
in practice it appears that the number of class enemies, as defined by the
DPRK authorities, is anything but small. According to a detailed classification
system set up in 1958 and conducted through a series of national surveys or
‘political examinations’, North Korean society is divided into three classes:
the ‘core class’, the ‘wavering class’ and the ‘hostile class’.24 The ‘core
class’ is essentially the North Korean ruling class and comprises approxi-
mately 28 per cent of the population, including relatives of Kim Il-sung and
Kim Jong-il and also high and mid-level cadres. The ‘wavering class’ com-
prises about 45 per cent of the population – urban and rural workers who
are not KWP members. The ‘hostile class’ comprises about 27 per cent of
the population – those individuals deemed to be enemies of the KWP; they
include people who owned land or business before the establishment of the
DPRK, public officials who worked under the Japanese colonial government,
religious activists and those thought to be in collaboration with the South
Korean government. A study compiled by the Seoul-based Korea Institute
for National Unification suggests that members of the ‘hostile class’ are
denied various rights in areas such as education, employment, housing and
medical benefits.
Those deemed to be members of the ‘hostile class’ are invariably categor-
ized by reference to their class background or class origin, in keeping with
Maoist definitions of class but in contrast to the conventional Marxist under-
standing of class as relative to a person’s socio-economic relationship to the
means of production.25 So, for example, even though two generations have
passed since the ‘socialist liberation’ of North Korea, an individual can still
be classified as a member of the ‘hostile class’ if his or her grandparents
owned land or business under the pre-socialist system or were in government
during the colonial period. This method of determining class status derives
from a belief that class is a ‘state of mind’. Consequently the mere fact that
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an individual may never have owned land or business under the old order or
was not employed as an official under Japanese rule (primarily because he
or she was not alive during that era!) does not mean that the individual in ques-
tion did not secretly harbour dangerous feelings of superiority over the ‘core’
and ‘wavering’ classes. The objective here has been to cast the net wide
enough to ensure that both actual and potential opponents of the regime are
identified and duly deprived of their rights.
In many respects the classification of individuals into classes is as much
nationalistic or juche-oriented as it is Marxist, not least because of the uncon-
ventional, non-Marxist manner in which people are classified. In discovering
a person’s ‘true’ class status, the KWP is seeking to identify those who are
loyal to the nation and the nation’s aims and objectives. For this reason the
surveys used to categorize people are referred to as ‘national loyalty
surveys’; only those who are deemed to be loyal to the nation are entitled
to rights.
Certain more recent pronouncements on human rights seem to support this
position. In one of several statements, Kim Jong-il suggests that an individ-
ual’s membership of society from which derives his entitlement to rights is
no longer dependent upon class status but rather on loyalty to the nation
and the nation’s objectives and interests. According to Kim, the barometer
for distinguishing whether a person can be deemed a member of North
Korean society and hence entitled to rights ‘lies not on the grounds of his
social class but on the grounds of his ideology’, by which Kim means his
nationalist ideology.26 Kim continues:
This approach incorporates different social classes and ideologies, not
only socialism or communism. Anyone who loves our country and
our people is eligible to serve the people and ultimately to be a
member of our society. The KWP believes that those people from differ-
ent classes or groups with whom we can share the interests of the revo-
lution are not temporary accompanists but eternal partners and this
strategy will finally lead the way to the success of socialism and
communism.27
This apparent shift towards national loyalty as a condition for entitlement
to rights is part of a more general movement towards juche in official North
Korean thinking. As the international community, led by the Bush adminis-
tration, has intensified its opposition to the DPRK particularly following the
recent nuclear crisis (although certain concessions have been made, as
noted above), the rhetoric of the Kim Jong-il regime has increasingly
focused on the perceived need to create an autarkic, self-sufficient nation
strong enough to exist independently of foreign trade and to resist foreign
intervention (notwithstanding DPRK demands for and acceptance of food
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and other forms of international aid). In order to realize this goal, Kim has
taken a much broader approach towards the category of people who are
entitled to rights in order to widen the basis of his popular support, and
thereby unite the nation against the perceived threat from abroad. This
approach recalls that taken during the early post-revolutionary period, as
discussed above.
The correlation between entitlement to rights and loyalty to the nation is
closely linked to Kim Jong-il’s philosophy of virtuous politics (indeok jeong-
chi) which first emerged in the early 1990s. According to this philosophy, Kim
governs as the sole benign ruler of the DPRK, acting exclusively to safeguard
and protect the interests of the masses and the nation. In turn only those people
who are loyal to the virtuous leader can enjoy rights. As a Rodong Sinmun edi-
torial explains, ‘in order to protect and fully realize “our style of socialism
[urisik sahoejui]” together with “our style of human rights”, each person
should thoroughly comprehend the juche ideology and be loyal to the KWP
and its leader from whom the greatest and true human rights are given’.28
The editorial continues: ‘it is our party’s “virtuous politics” that can protect
human rights in their highest degree’.29
The language of virtuous politics is not exclusive to the concept of juche: it
is also drawn from Korea’s centuries-old Confucian tradition as inherited from
China. In accordance with the teachings of the Confucian disciple Mencius, as
enshrined in the doctrine of ‘benevolent government’ (renzheng), the emperor
was obliged to govern with a kind of paternal wisdom, acting only with the
interests of the people in mind. This obligation was believed to be ordained
by heaven, and handed down by ‘heaven’ as a form of ‘mandate’ (tianming).
Any emperor who failed to act accordingly automatically forfeited his entitle-
ment to rule, so that a new and more virtuous ruler could challenge and over-
throw the now illegitimate regime.30
The concept of virtuous politics with its emphasis on benevolent rule from
‘above’ suggests that rights in North Korean thinking are not innate to our
humanity, something that we enjoy by virtue of our intrinsic moral worth as
human beings. Instead, rights are the property of the virtuous leader which
he bestows on the people as a type of ‘gift’ or ‘grant’ to those who are
deemed loyal to his leadership and his government. By the same token, of
course, rights can be withheld or withdrawn from those who are not deemed
to be loyal.31
None the less, there are occasional references in the official literature to a
notion of innate human rights which are universal to all citizens, not just
those loyal to the nation. These references are invariably made in response
to American criticism of North Korea’s human rights record. As Ahn
Myung-hyuk explains in an article entitled ‘America is the World’s Worst
Violator of Human Rights’,
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Human rights are the divine rights of every human being in the world.
Human rights should be protected not only in the territory of one specific
country but also internationally. Human rights violations in one country
are detrimental to global prosperity and civilization and the violating
country should be subjected to international criticism.32
The ‘violating country’ referred to above is clearly the US; and, while the
context for this quotation is the ‘war of words’ between North Korea and the
US, it is apparent that North Korea is prepared to use the language of Western
human rights much more than in the past. The recognition of universal and
innate human rights (although sporadic) reflects both the growing inter-
national dominance of the Western discourse of human rights and North
Korea’s acceptance (at least in part) that it needs to explain itself in terms
of this discourse.
Prioritizing Collective Rights
A second prominent feature of North Korean rights thinking is the significance
attached to collectivism and the rights of the collective. This is particularly
apparent in post-1948 DPRK constitutions. For example, Article 68 of the
1972 Constitution insists that ‘citizens must display a high degree of collecti-
vist spirit’ and ‘must cherish their collective and organization and establish the
revolutionary trait of working devotedly for the sake of society and the people
and for the interests of the homeland and the revolution’. Similarly, Article 82
of the amended 1992 Constitution describes collectivism as ‘the basis of life in
a socialist society’ and likewise implores citizens to ‘cherish their organiz-
ation and collective for the good of society and the people’. The collective
interests of the family also feature strongly, with the 1972 Constitution and
each of the 1992 and 1998 amended Constitutions declaring that ‘the state
pays great attention to consolidating the family, the basic unit of social life’
(Articles 63, 77 and 78 respectively). Indeed, the preamble to the 1998 docu-
ment lauds Kim Il-sung for transforming the whole of North Korean society
into ‘one big united family’.
The relationship between individual and collective rights in terms of
which type of right takes priority is not immediately obvious. This is partly
because the number of constitutional rights ascribed to the individual far
exceeds those ascribed to the collective. Furthermore, in contrast to the
Soviet and Chinese constitutional traditions, there is no explicit provision in
DPRK constitutions which rescinds an individual right if it is exercised in a
manner deemed to be harmful to the welfare of the collective (that is, state,
society and the nation).33 Nevertheless, we can probably say that collective
rights in North Korean constitutional thinking are given priority. This is
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borne out by reference to the broad-based and overriding nature of the
provisions discussed in the paragraph above and also by reference to an over-
riding principle contained in all three post-1948 DPRK constitutions that
appears towards the beginning of the chapter on rights and duties. This
states that ‘the rights and duties of citizens are based on the collectivist prin-
ciple of “one for all and all for one”’(see Articles 49, 63 and 63 respectively).
A number of criticisms can be levelled against a constitutional system that
prioritizes collective rights over individual rights, most notably that it
breaches the very principles of individual autonomy and independence from
the state upon which the idea of individual rights is founded. For many
liberal rights theorists, individual rights are sacrosanct, although some scho-
lars have identified exceptional circumstances under which an individual
right can be justifiably infringed (for example, in order to protect the lives
of others).34 There is also a degree of scepticism regarding what criteria the
state uses to define whether the exercise of an individual right has breached
the collective good: critics might ask whether the collective good as defined
by the state is simply what is good for the state.
DPRK commentators have defended the prioritization of collective rights
by suggesting that the individual is dependent on the collective for the enjoy-
ment of his rights. Only if the rights of the collective are fully realized, it is
argued, can the rights of the individual be fully realized: the former is thus
a precondition for the latter. Kim Young-guk explains the background to
this position in an article published in 1998:
You can transform your natural and societal environment and therefore
realize your personal goals within this environment but it is only poss-
ible through collective co-operation with other members of a society,
never by or for yourself. In order to establish a group in a society you
should first initiate your self-reliant goals within your group. An individ-
ual’s independent needs will be treated as equal to those of other
members of the group. However, they can only be realized through col-
lective decisions within the group that you belong to depending on
whether your personal needs are matched with others and contribute
to the ultimate goals of society.35
Within such a strong collective context, there is also the question of when
it is ethically appropriate for the individual to exercise his rights. Although an
individual may be legally or constitutionally entitled to certain rights, any
assertion of these rights that militates against the higher interests of the collec-
tive is perceived to be morally reprehensible, even selfish. As Kim Young-guk
explains, ‘an individual’s demands set apart from the collective interest would
be considered as greediness and selfishness and consequently would infringe
other members’ interests and weaken the unity and the co-operation of the
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group you belong to’.36 The better way in the event of a conflict is for the
individual to yield selflessly to the greater good.
This emphasis on the collective derives in part from the Marxist perception
of the individual as a ‘species being’, someone who is born into society, is an
intrinsic part of that society, and depends upon it for the fulfilment of his needs
and his all-round development as a human being. As Marx wrote in Grun-
drisse in 1857–58, ‘man is in the most literal sense of the word a zoon poli-
tikon, not only a social animal, but an animal which can develop into an
individual only in society’.37 Similarly in articulating his position on the
‘social nature’ of man (shehuixing), Mao Zedong insisted that the individual
was quite literally a ‘product’ of society in which ‘individuals do not
possess sentiments, goals, interests, skills, and knowledge prior to or indepen-
dently of membership in a social organization. Rather these are formed in
society’.38
There are a number of equivalent references in North Korean documents.
Kim Jong-il stated during a KWP conference in 1986 that ‘the people will
become a sovereign unified force only if they are organized as one socio-
political species-being, structurally and ideologically united, centred upon
the leader and under the guidance of the party’.39 Similarly, during a party
meeting in 1992, Kim emphasized that ‘if a society can become a socio-
political species-being within which the sovereign rights of individuals and
groups are realized, that society will have achieved the perfect conditions
for collective social relations’.40
The stress on selflessness in North Korean rights thinking is also grounded
in Marxism. In a manner similar to Liu Shaoqi in his ideological guidelines for
CCP members,41 Kim Il-sung wrote at length on the need for party members to
subordinate themselves to the greater good of the collective. According to
Kim:
. . . party members should have a strong mental attitude towards the
party and the revolution and one that requires devotion and sacrifice
from each member, while maintaining a high degree of dignity. Party
members should feel proud of the dedicated struggle for the party, the
revolution and the nation and must not seek any personal reward.
Each party member should be dedicated to the party’s revolutionary
tasks, working as a selfless hero.42
Beyond the confines of the party, extensive efforts have been made to instil
an attitude of selflessness into the general public, primarily through the use of
role models as part of what are referred to as ‘learn from the hero’ campaigns
( youngwoong ttara baewooki). In each campaign the role model is portrayed
as supremely self-sacrificing, working for the good of those around him as
well as for the party, the revolution and the nation. The public are encouraged
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to learn from and (where relevant) imitate this behaviour in an effort to create
a genuinely socialist society. In some cases the role model is just an ordinary
person going about his everyday activities in an altruistic yet almost heroic
manner. In other cases the role model is more extraordinary in his achieve-
ments, often breaking new ground for the benefit of the collective.
One example of the ‘ordinary hero’ is Kim Ki-bong, a low-ranking soldier
with the Cho Sung-il regiment. According to a report from the Korean Central
News Agency in February 2004, Kim died after he threw himself in front of a
hand grenade that had exploded by mistake during a routine military exercise.
In sacrificing his own life, Kim saved the lives of numerous others for which
he was posthumously accorded the title of ‘Hero of the Republic’ (gonghwa-
guk youngwoong), an award created in 1950 to honour acts of supreme mili-
tary bravery.43 Following Kim’s death the government launched a concerted
campaign to ‘emulate Kim Ki-bong’ (Kim Ki-bong ttara baewooki).44 ‘Extra-
ordinary heroes’ usually comprise nuclear scientists or physicists such as
Hyun Yong-ra and Lee Ung-chan who, it is claimed, have contributed to
North Korea’s military capability.45 With these campaigns the public are
encouraged, more realistically, to admire and appreciate rather than imitate
the individuals in question.
Notwithstanding the influence of Marxism on collective rights thinking in
North Korea, this predilection towards collectivism did not suddenly appear
with the arrival of the KWP and the subsequent implementation of a
Marxist state ideology. Instead, North Korean Marxism inherited an
entrenched tradition of Confucian collectivism. Like the Chinese Confucian
order on which the Korean system was so closely modelled, the interests of
the family were especially dominant, taking priority in almost every sphere
of an individual’s life from childhood through to old age. In marriage and
betrothal, for instance, it was the family, specifically the family elders, who
selected partners for their offspring. Here the principal concern was not the
direct wishes of those to be married but the perceived long-term interests of
the family.46 As noted above, the family remains a key social unit in North
Korea and, to a large extent, closely reflects the continued presence of
Confucianism in North Korean society.
There are also deep strains of Confucianism in the North Korean emphasis
on selflessness. The Confucian Analects contains numerous references to self-
lessness as a virtuous and honourable form of behaviour. In it Confucius wrote
that ‘to subdue one’s self and return to propriety, is perfect virtue’.47 Conver-
sely any preoccupation with individual interests is closely associated with
egoism, the most acute kind of moral bankruptcy in the Confucian ethical
code. As Lau notes in his introduction to the Analects, ‘of all the things that
are likely to distort man’s moral judgement and deflect him from his moral
purpose, self-interest is the strongest, the most persistent and the most
HUMAN RIGHTS IN NORTH KOREA 285
insidious’.48 One important feature of the Confucian scholar or ‘gentleman’
was ‘the cultivation of the self’. However, the attainment of this trait was
regarded not as a means to any individual ends, but as a way of improving
the moral character of others and of enhancing the fabric of society as a
whole. As Confucius insisted, a man who achieves moral self-cultivation
‘does not merely accomplish the self-completion of himself; with this
quality he completes other men’.49
A third influence on North Korean collective rights thinking is the philos-
ophy of juche. While Marxism and Confucianism remain significant in this
respect, as reflected by the continued references to man as a ‘social’ or
‘species’ being, the focus is now much more on the rights of the nation,
specifically the right to national sovereignty ( jajukweon). According to offi-
cial thinking, as the outside world intensifies its opposition towards North
Korea it is increasingly incumbent upon the KWP to protect and safeguard
the sovereignty of the nation. If the right to the sovereignty of the nation
cannot be guaranteed, it is argued, then neither can the rights of individual citi-
zens since, using the logic of Kim Young-guk noted above, the latter depend
upon the former for the realization of their rights. As Kim Jong-il has
suggested, ‘human rights cannot be thought of independently of the nation’s
sovereignty’.50 Similarly, in a statement given to the 61st Session of the UN
Human Rights General Assembly in November 2006 it is asserted that
‘human rights are the rights of the state or the nation. Human rights without
the right of national sovereignty are merely an illusion’.51
The emphasis on the right to national sovereignty in North Korea has
developed specifically in response to growing international criticism of its
human rights record. The November 2006 statement pointedly remarks that
‘human beings enjoy their human rights not through unwelcome and arrogant
advice from the United States or other Western countries, but through the pro-
tective measures of the country to which the individual belongs’.52 Any such
‘advice’ from theWest on human rights is fiercely rejected as a form of unwar-
ranted meddling in North Korea’s internal affairs, in itself a violation of North
Korea’s right to national sovereignty. According to Kim Jong-il, in criticizing
the human rights practice of other countries,
. . . the imperialists indiscriminately intervene in their internal affairs
and violate their sovereignty under the guise of international human
rights. Human rights can never be fully realized without the protection
afforded by national sovereignty. People who are under foreign rule can
never enjoy true human rights.53
Pyongyang’s reaction in this respect draws parallels with China’s response
to Western critics of its human rights. In its numerous statements on the
subject, Beijing invariably accuses the West not only of interfering in
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China’s domestic affairs through its criticism of Chinese human rights, but
also of attempting to contain an economically resurgent China from assuming
its ‘rightful’ place in the world as a leading power.54 China is also quick to
accuse the West of gross hypocrisy by identifying Western violations of
human rights in both a historical and a contemporary context. North Korea
has also taken this line:
The imperialists do not recognize the right of the jobless to work and of
the homeless and orphans to food. Western imperialists are not qualified
to speak about human rights because they do not provide workers with
basic rights to live. Even worse than that, they practise anti-humanitarian
policies, racial discrimination and colonial policies.55
Welfare Rights and the Right to Subsistence
The reference in the above quotation to the right to work and to food brings us
to the final theme of North Korean rights thinking to be examined in this
article, namely the emphasis on socio-economic or welfare rights. Not only
is this emphasis apparent in much of the official rhetoric on rights (see
below) but it has also been a prominent feature of DPRK constitutional
rights. Each of the four DPRK constitutional documents contains a wide
range of welfare rights, including the rights to work, rest, free medical care
and education, and also certain welfare benefits enjoyed by mothers, although
it is extremely questionable whether such rights are provided for in practice.56
These rights are presented as more than just statements of intent in that they
include clauses that purport to guarantee each right. For example, the
amended 1998 Constitution states that those who work ‘are provided with
stable jobs and working conditions’ (Article 70). The right to rest is ensured
not only by ‘the establishment of fixed working hours, the provision of holi-
days and paid leave’ but also more extravagantly by ‘accommodation at
health resorts and holiday homes’, all at the state’s expense (Article 71).
The right to free medical care is guaranteed by ‘an expanding network of hos-
pitals, sanatoria and other medical institutions’ (Article 72). The right to edu-
cation is provided by ‘an advanced educational system’ (Article 73) and
mothers are afforded ‘special protection’ through the provision of ‘maternity
leave, reduced working hours for mothers with many children and a substan-
tial number of maternity hospitals, cre`ches and kindergartens’ (Article 77).
The focus on welfare rights in North Korea is a key aspect of the Marxist
tradition of rights. During the fanfare that surrounded the promulgation of the
1936 Soviet Constitution, official commentators heaped praise on the distinc-
tively ‘socialist’ economic achievements of the first two Five-Year Plans
(1928–32 and 1932–36) which, they claimed, laid the material foundations
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necessary for the proper enjoyment of the five welfare rights detailed in the
constitution (Articles 118–22). Moreover, like subsequent North Korean con-
stitutions the 1936 Constitution contained provisions that pledged to ensure
each right. The stress on welfare rights has also been a feature of the PRC’s
constitutional tradition. The most recent constitution, promulgated in 1982,
sets out five welfare rights (Articles 42–46), although there are no ‘guarantee’
clauses in this or any of the previous three PRC constitutions (1954, 1975 and
1978). Some of the more recent Chinese pronouncements on welfare rights
concentrate specifically on the right to subsistence (shengcunquan). Encom-
passing the basic rights to food, clothing and accommodation, the right to sub-
sistence is officially heralded as the ‘foremost’ human right in China, ‘without
which all other rights are out of the question’.57
The importance attached to welfare rights in Marxist states stems primar-
ily from the practical realities confronting Marxist regimes. While Marx
himself envisaged the gradual diminution of any need for rights in his materi-
ally abundant post-revolutionary society based on the egalitarian principle of
‘to each according to his need’, the reality of the situation has been quite
different.58 On coming to power, Marxist regimes, including the KWP, have
been faced with conditions of social and economic deprivation usually
within a post-colonial or war-torn context (sometimes both). In such circum-
stances, the Marxist stress on welfare rights is intrinsically tied to the need to
foster rapid social and economic development and to raise the living standards
of the masses.
As well as the influence of Marxism there is a Confucian element to the
DPRK’s emphasis on welfare rights. We saw earlier how the Mencian
notion of benevolent government imposed a sacred obligation on the
emperor to govern exclusively in the interests of the populace. This obligation
applied in particular to their welfare interests. In his frequent consultations
with Chinese feudal kings, Mencius underlined the paramount necessity of
providing food, shelter and employment for the people of a state, otherwise
known as the doctrine of ‘the people as the basis of the state’ (minwei
bangben).59 Indeed, the legitimacy of the emperor – his ‘heavenly-ordained’
mandate – was deemed to be contingent upon his ability to guarantee the sus-
tenance and livelihood of his people. Hence, although welfare rights are a
common feature of Marxist states, in North Korean rights thinking their
importance seems to be enhanced by the tradition of thought that sees the pro-
vision of welfare rights not just as one of the state’s obligations to the people
but as its principal obligation.
The philosophy of juche has also influenced the North Korean perspective
on welfare rights. This is particularly apparent in relation to the right to subsis-
tence (saengjonkweon), the realization of which is often expressed as part of a
wider struggle for national independence from foreign domination. For
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example, in a 1937 article that urged Korean communists to rise up and liberate
the Korean nation from Japanese colonial rule, Kim Il-sung condemned Japan
for neglecting the subsistence rights of the Korean people:
Korean workers are deprived of their subsistence rights in a most brutal
manner through the exploitation of the Japanese authorities. Women and
children in particular are heavily oppressed by the Japanese who are
motivated only by the need to maximize the economic benefits of colo-
nization, forcing the Korean people to work between 12 and 18 hours
each day.60
Kim made a similar point with regard to what he perceived as the Amer-
ican colonization of South Korea following the post-war division of Korea. In
a 1967 article expounding the principles of national self-reliance, Kim argued
that South Korea had become subordinate to America in every aspect of its
government and society, and that ‘hopeless South Koreans have to endure
the intolerable ethnic discrimination of the American invaders, constantly
threatening the right to subsistence of the Korean people’.61 Likewise, in a
1966 article calling on anti-government protestors in South Korea to unite
with the North and create an independent Korea, Kim asked the demonstrators
to consider seriously whether their subsistence rights and living conditions
were respected by the South Korean government.62
Kim frequently referred to juche when identifying the KWP’s claimed
success in guaranteeing the subsistence rights of the North Korean populace.
For example, at a 1974 KWP congress meeting during which the party decided
to abolish the system of taxation, Kim noted that
. . . the supremacy of ‘our style of socialism’ which is based on the ideol-
ogy of juche is evident through the fact that people in the DPRK are well
looked after in their material and cultural lives. The complete abolition
of taxation will give hope to those South Koreans who are fighting for
democratic freedom, subsistence rights and independent and peaceful
unification despite the unprecedented fascist violence of the South
Korean regime.63
The right to subsistence is also expressed as a right belonging to the nation,
and here again we can detect the distinct hallmark of juche. According to the
party theorist Kim Chang-ryul in his analysis of human rights, the right to sub-
sistence should be understood not only as an individual right to food, clothing
and accommodation but also as a national right of survival within an inter-
national environment of hostile powers that, it is asserted, seek to isolate
and then dismantle the DPRK.64 Kim Jong-il has built on this view in his fre-
quently made correlation between subsistence rights and the right to national
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self-determination which in turn brings us back to the relationship between
individual and collective rights:
National self-determination and independence from foreign rule is a
fundamental pre-condition to the realization of the nation’s subsistence
rights and development. Only if there is national self-determination can
these rights be protected and can the nation’s destiny be independently
developed according to its needs and deeds and the nation’s external
relations be improved on the basis of equality and mutual benefits.65
Official Chinese discussions of subsistence rights are likewise expounded
in strong nationalistic tones. During the period of imperialist domination
(1840–1911), it is argued, the Chinese people were unable to enjoy basic
rights to subsistence as ‘the imperialists sold, maltreated and caused the
death of numerous Chinese labourers, plunging countless people in old
China into an abyss of misery’. Little improved during the Republican
period (1912–49) as the KMT ‘failed to deliver the nation from semi-coloni-
alism’. Although the establishment of the PRC brought about the end of
foreign occupation of China, the Chinese people finally ‘stood up as
masters of their own country’, their subsistence rights were still not guaranteed
because China remained under-developed and hence under threat from foreign
attack. It is only since the introduction of economic reform, it is argued, that
the right to subsistence has been guaranteed, and this is duly described as ‘an
historical achievement made by the Chinese people and government in
seeking and protecting human rights’.66
Conclusions
This article has identified and analysed an official North Korean discourse of
human rights, separable into at least three themes: rights are conditional rather
than universal, collective rights take priority over individual rights, and
special importance is attached to welfare and subsistence rights. In each
case Marxism has been a significant influencing factor. The condition that
only the proletariat is entitled to rights at the expense of the bourgeoisie is
an integral feature of the Marxist class struggle between these two antagonistic
classes. The prioritization of collective rights draws on the Marxist conviction
that the individual is a component part of his society, literally a ‘species
being’. The stress on welfare and subsistence rights forms part of a wider
Marxist concern with safeguarding the material well-being of the masses,
usually under impoverished socio-economic conditions.
In addition to Marxism, Korea’s long-standing Confucian tradition has
been important in shaping DPRK rights thinking. This is particularly apparent
in relation to the contemporary emphasis on collective rights, which can
290 JOURNAL OF COMMUNIST STUDIES AND TRANSITION POLITICS
ultimately be traced to the Confucian practice of subordinating individual
interests to those of the group (specifically the family) and to the firmly-
held conviction that any preoccupation with individual interests is selfish
and hence morally undesirable. Strains of Confucianism are also evident in
Kim Jong-il’s concept of virtuous politics (as part of the more recent
‘loyalty’ condition for entitlement to rights) and in the North Korean position
on welfare and subsistence rights.
Finally, we have seen how juche has impinged on DPRK rights thinking,
eclipsing Marxism in this regard. This has reflected a more general movement
away from Marxism and towards a juche-oriented state ideology in reaction to
North Korea’s increasing isolation from the international community since the
end of the Cold War. The significance of class and class rights has recently
diminished in favour of loyalty to the nation and obedience to Kim Jong-il
as the condition for entitlement to rights. The accent on collective rights has
likewise taken a more juche-based form through the increased focus on the
rights to national sovereignty and national self-determination. Similarly,
welfare and particularly subsistence rights are closely linked to juche as
part of an historical struggle for national independence from foreign
imperialism.
The North Korean discourse on human rights remains very much an offi-
cial discourse, espoused, as we have seen, by the nation’s two post-war
leaders, Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, and reinforced by commentators who
speak exclusively on behalf of the ruling party. In contrast to the situation
that has developed in neighbouring China, where there is now a lively scho-
larly debate on human rights as evidenced by a growing academic literature
on the subject, the convening of an increasing number of human rights confer-
ences and even an undergraduate module on human rights (at Guangzhou Uni-
versity), there is no domestic debate on human rights among North Korean
academics. Moreover, there is little to suggest that this is likely to change
in the near future.67
Despite the apparent rigidity of the DPRK’s stance on rights, it is signifi-
cant that North Korea is at least engaging in a human rights dialogue, increas-
ingly so in recent years. Although references to rights before the 1990s were
not unusual, the increase in Western criticism of North Korea’s human rights
record since the end of the Cold War has pushed North Korea into a position
where it increasingly feels obliged to respond to this criticism. In many cases
Pyongyang simply defaults to its familiar defensive nationalist position by
accusing its Western critics of interfering in North Korea’s internal affairs.
But there is now, as we have seen, a much clearer idea of where North
Korea stands in terms of its own conceptions of human rights, particularly
concerning issues such as the conditionality of rights and the prioritization
of collective and subsistence rights. There are also signs that North Korea is
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absorbing Western idea on rights through its – albeit infrequent – official
references to universal and innate notions of human rights.
As a final point it is worth noting a possible parallel with China. The pro-
liferation of Chinese ideas about human rights over the past decade or so came
about directly as a result of foreign criticism of China’s human rights practice,
especially after the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown which provoked a dra-
matic increase in such criticism. This led to the publication of the numerous
human rights white papers referred to above and then to the academic
debate on the subject. It is by no means certain that North Korea will
follow in China’s footsteps, however. Unlike China, North Korea has not
opened its doors to international trade so there is less of a perceived need to
be accepted by the international community on issues such as human rights,
although this may come if North Korea accelerates its tentative steps
towards economic reform.68 Nor is there anything like the freedom of aca-
demic expression that China today enjoys (relative to North Korea), as evi-
denced by a far greater number of human rights experts and human rights
publications. But there is at least a precedent for North Korea to follow.
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